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Abstract

Incorporating security in supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems
and sensor networks has proven to be a pervasive problem due to the constraints and
demands placed on these systems. Both attackers and security professionals seek to
uncover the inherent roots of trust in a system to achieve opposing goals. With SCADA
systems, a battle is being fought at the cyber–physical level, speciﬁcally the programmable
logic controller (PLC). The Stuxnet worm, which became increasingly apparent in the
summer of 2010, has shown that modiﬁcations to a SCADA system can be discovered
on infected engineering workstations on the network, to include the ladder logic found in
the PLC. However, certain ﬁrmware modiﬁcations made to a PLC can go undetected due
to the lack of eﬀective techniques available for detecting them.
Current software auditing tools give an analyst a singular view of assembly code, and
binary diﬀerence programs can only show simple diﬀerences between assembly codes.
Additionally, there appears to be no comprehensive software tool that aids an analyst
with evaluating a PLC ﬁrmware ﬁle for modiﬁcations and displaying the resulting eﬀects.
Manual analysis is time consuming and error prone. Furthermore, there are not enough
talented individuals available in the industrial control system (ICS) community with an
in-depth knowledge of assembly language and the inner workings of PLC ﬁrmware.
This research presents a novel analysis technique that compares a suspected-altered
ﬁrmware to a known good ﬁrmware of a speciﬁc PLC and performs a static analysis of
diﬀerences. This technique includes multiple tests to compare both ﬁrmware versions,
detect diﬀerences in size, and code diﬀerences such as removing, adding, or modifying
existing functions in the original ﬁrmware. A proof-of-concept experiment demonstrates
the functionality of the analysis tool using diﬀerent ﬁrmware versions from an AllenBradley ControlLogix L61 PLC.

iv

“But let your communication be, Yea, yea; Nay, nay:
for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.” – Matthew 5:37
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FIRMWARE MODIFICATION ANALYSIS
IN PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLERS

I.

1.1

Introduction

Background
Ancient and modern militaries have adopted the use of uniforms both to identify

themselves on the battle ﬁeld and bolster pride and esprit-de-corps in their units. In modern
times they serve to provide concealment using camouﬂage. Uniforms have an added beneﬁt
of aiding military commanders during inspections to quickly identify Soldiers who are out
of uniform, due to the standard appearance that is prescribed to uniformity. It is this theme
of uniformity that may provide a key to software modiﬁcation detection.
Security is a cat-and-mouse game that is played asymmetrically. An attacker may be
one step ahead of security professionals in one aspect, and the security professionals may
be several steps ahead of the attacker in other aspects. In order for information technology
(IT) security to converge to a seamless barrier of protection, security professionals cannot
wait for attackers to breach a layer of security before addressing a problem. Security
professionals must assume that attackers have the knowledge, tools, and skills to conduct
viable attacks against an organizations defenses [47, 48].
Industrial control systems (ICS) have a blend of modern and legacy devices that
make up our modern manufacturing and energy producing landscape. Our society is
economically and physically dependent on this infrastructure for day-to-day operations.
Therefore, security techniques must thoroughly cover the limitations and safety concerns
inherent with ICS cyber-physical devices.

1

1.2

Motivation
Programmable logic controllers (PLC) are critical components to ICS and supervisory

control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems and are crucial to the ICS security aspect.
Though no current malware has been published for PLCs, this potential problem can have
devastating and long lasting consequences across a community or country. It must be
assumed that attackers have the capabilities to alter the ﬁrmware of these devices in order to
disrupt them and cause damage to SCADA systems found at critical infrastructure facilities
such as a water treatment plant or power plant. Eﬀorts must be prioritized to meet these
potential threats.
Research in PLC security has grown in the past few years, but is slow due to the
complexities and diﬃculties surrounding it. Many have proposed security solutions aimed
at protection, but few have addressed the area of detection. Detecting security issues is the
foundation of information assurance (IA) and is key in building the security strategy for
protection, detection, response, and recovery capabilities for PLCs.
1.3

Research Goals
This research assumes that a facility with ICS has been compromised, and that a vector

of attack focused on altering PLC ﬁrmware. Since PLCs do not have built in software
security, attackers can potentially modify a PLC’s ﬁrmware and have full control of the
device while evading detection [3].
The goal of this research is to develop a technique that detects and analyzes PLC
ﬁrmware modiﬁcations. The main question asked is how can PLC ﬁrmware modiﬁcations
be detected and how does one characterize the nature of the modiﬁcations detected?
From this main question further questions are asked to answer the main question. Is a
modiﬁcation made? What is added or deleted to the suspect ﬁle compare to the baseline
ﬁle? What opcode characteristics changed? Where is code changed in the ﬁrmware?
Finally, what functionality is modiﬁed, added, or deleted to the suspect ﬁle?
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The technique that answers these questions is expressed as a software tool that
automates the analysis and compares a known-good baseline with a suspect ﬁrmware
ﬁle to determine if the suspect is modiﬁed. The tool then characterizes and displays the
diﬀerences analyzed including additions or deletions made to the suspect ﬁle compare to
the baseline. This software runs separately from the PLC or engineering workstation, and
does not introduce an additional attack vector into the PLC or SCADA system.
1.4

Approach
This research develops an automated technique for detecting and analyzing modiﬁed

PLC ﬁrmware. The technique uses several static analysis of diﬀerences methods between a
baseline ﬁrmware ﬁle and suspect ﬁrmware ﬁle of the same version. The major steps in the
ﬁrmware modiﬁcation analysis technique are: (1) hash comparison, (2) size comparison,
(3) disassembly of both ﬁrmware ﬁles, (4) opcode histogram comparison, (5) opcode
diﬀerence comparison, (6) and function diﬀerence comparison. The ﬁrst step detects
modiﬁcations made to the suspect, while the latter steps characterize the nature of the
modiﬁcation if detected. Once these steps are performed, views are generated to indicate
how, and where the modiﬁcations were made at the opcode instruction level.
The technique is then tested using ﬁve test cases and one control case representing
various degrees of modiﬁcations. Both the baseline and suspect are obtained from the
manufacturer’s website. The baseline ﬁrmware remains unmodiﬁed, while three suspect
ﬁrmware test cases are modiﬁed. The remaining three test cases are unmodiﬁed, including
the control case. Once the ﬁrmware samples are obtained, the test cases are compared
to their baseline ﬁrmware ﬁle versions using the automated technique. The techniques
eﬀectiveness is evaluated based on the test results which are validated by the a fellow
graduate student who performed the modiﬁcations on the suspect ﬁrmware samples.
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1.5

Contributions
This research intends to provide a detection tool that identiﬁes and displays the

modiﬁcations made to PLC ﬁrmware. This tool could be useful in aiding incident response
teams in identifying and conﬁrming modiﬁcations made to ﬁrmware, and enable them to
ascertain the extent of the modiﬁcation quickly and accurately.
1.6

Organization
The paper is organized as follows. Chapter II covers background research done with

SCADA security, PLC security, and PLC malware detection. It also covers the current
tools used in static analysis of PLC ﬁrmware and their limitations. Chapter III covers the
ﬁrmware modiﬁcation analysis methodology and Chapter IV covers the test cases which
will evaluate the methodolgy. Chapter V covers results of the analysis, and Chapter VI
presents future work and concludes the paper.
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II.

Background

In this chapter, a brief example of SCADA device functionality is covered. Next,
general SCADA security issues is discussed, covering diﬀerent aspects of the security
issues to give the reader an appreciation of the diﬃculty surrounding this topic. Further
focus is placed on PLC security and the research that has addressed this topic. Finally,
current tools and techniques used for reverse engineering ﬁrmware and detecting ﬁrmware
alterations are discussed.
2.1

Cyber-Physical Devices
Remote Terminal Units (RTU) and PLCs are small computerized systems deployed

at speciﬁc sites operating in a closed loop feedback system [6]. They provide the ability
to measure and control physical processes that form the backbone of ICS. These devices
collect data and interact with sensors, motors, valves, and other devices throughout an
industrial complex and integrate them into the industrial control system for streamlined
management and automation control.

Industry uses these devices to operate power

plants, automobile manufacturing plants, water treatment facilities, and pharmaceutical
manufacturers. RTU and PLC devices are purposefully designed with limited on-board
computing resources and functionality such as microprocessors, minimal memory, sensor
inputs and outputs, and limited network capabilities to balance cost with eﬃciency. They
are required to work in rugged conditions and handle diﬀerent types of sensory data
in real time, and work uninterrupted for an extended period of time. These systems
are designed to have an expected life cycle of at least 10 to 12 years [6], and system
engineers typically carry identical PLC spares in their inventory for ease of maintenance.
Due to modernization, demand for inter-connectivity with business enterprise networks,
and Internet accessibility, many closed and standalone SCADA systems are being
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interconnected and integrated into these front end networks [6, 34]. The rapid growth on
interconnected SCADA systems coupled with improvements in performance requirements
of SCADA devices introduced security vulnerabilities that current information technology
security models could not adequately protect [8, 34, 71]. Figure 2.1 illustrates a typical
water pump station installation commonly deployed in a metropolitan neighborhood. The
SCADA system relies on PLCs to perform monitoring, control, and communications tasks.

Figure 2.1: Pump Station to Sub-Master PLC Network [58]

In the example shown in Figure 2.1, the PLC controls physical devices such as
pumps, ﬂow meters, switches, relays, and solenoids found at a pump station. The PLC
operates autonomously and periodically receives updated commands issued through a
master terminal unit (MTU) further upstream in the system hierarchy. SCADA wireless
data communication links, like the ones shown in the example, are often unsecure or
vulnerable to attacks [51, 60]. The unsecure communication links provide an opportunity
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for an unauthorized user to intercept and gain access to any of the PLCs through a wireless
connection. Anyone with the knowledge, skill, ability, and appropriate equipment can
communicate directly with the PLC and aﬀect the physical devices being monitored and
controlled by the PLC.
2.2

PLC Composition
A PLC is essentially a miniaturized computer which receives inputs from physical

devices, performs computations and logic (e.g.,sequencing, timing, counting, and
arithmetic) based on the inputs, then produces outputs that further controls physical devices
[5, 6]. As shown in Figure 2.2 the PLC itself is composed of three layers as discussed by
McMinn et al. [49].

Figure 2.2: PLC Composition Layers [49]
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2.2.1

Hardware Layer.

The PLC is a specialized computer systems architecture composed of a microprocessor, volatile and non-volatile memory (RAM and ROM), extended storage for ladder logic
(ﬂash memory), power supply, and additional micro-controllers that manage input and output devices connected to the PLC via a back-plane or communications interface [5]. The
controller itself may be stand alone or designed to ﬁt on a rack with other devices.
2.2.2

Firmware Layer.

The ﬁrmware layer of the PLC represents the software that governs the PLC and the
control it has on input and output devices. It contains the operating system and software
drivers that control devices such as pumps, solenoids, robotics, and telemetry sensors. PLC
manufacturers custom design this software based on the capabilities and application of its
hardware. Some PLCs have hardware speciﬁcations that allow the operating system to
contain a Windows like interface, while other PLC ﬁrmwares have monolithic operating
systems and do not provide a human interface directly to the PLC environment. PLCs
operate under four scan cycles [6].
The ﬁrst cycle involves administrative overhead functions such as I/O integrity and
hardware diagnostic validation. This scan also allows the watchdog timer to interrupt the
cycles (for safety reasons) in case the processor has locked up, or the device has faulted.
The second scan addresses inputs from input devices and writes data to the input memory
table. This records data or position feedback provided by sensors. The third scan cycle
performs the ladder logic which is discussed in the programmable layer section. The fourth
scan writes the results of the logic computations performed in the third scan and writes the
data to the output memory table, which is communicated to the output devices. These four
cycles repeat and is the essential operations of a PLC.
PLC ﬁrmware is upgradable and may be updated directly to the PLC typically using
an RS-232 serial cable or Ethernet connection. Other PLCs may require a proprietary cable
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connection, such as the Allen Bradley Micrologix 1000. Normally this involves placing the
PLC in a programmable state, and using the manufacturer’s software interface and ﬁrmware
update package to perform the update.
2.2.3

Programmable Layer.

The programmable layer of the PLC is represented by ladder logic, which directs the
PLC to perform speciﬁc logic tasks. In the third scan cycle, data was written to the input
memory table. This data translates to inputs programmed into the ladder logic. The logic
will then dictate how that input is interpreted and what the resulting action will be. The
ladder logic speciﬁes what type the input will be (e.g., valve or motor), what the value from
the input represents (e.g., on, oﬀ, true, false, time, count), and what the resulting value will
be placed to another speciﬁc device (e.g., light switched on). This programmable layer
bridges the operating system portion of the ﬁrmware to its device-speciﬁc driver software
[5, 6].
Ladder logic is typically designed using the manufacturers design software, and
uploaded to the PLC in a similar manner as the ﬁrmware update. This procedure details
diﬀers from manufacturer to manufacturer, but essentially involves uploading the ladder
logic project from an engineering workstation to a PLC.
2.3

SCADA Security Issues
Some examples of cyber-attacks aimed toward ICS and industry include Stuxnet [44],

an Australian sewage treatment plant incident [1], and the industrial network breaches of
Slammer [16, 46] and Shamoon [7]. In March of 2000, the Maroochy Water Service Plant
in Queensland, Australia sustained a cyber-attack from a disgruntled prospect employee
over a period of three months [1]. Vitek Boden was not hired by the company most
likely caused by his prior strained relationship with a similar water service company named
Hunter Watertech. Wanting revenge, he used radio equipment to send commands at least
46 times to the Maroochy sewage equipment. The resulting actions caused approximately
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800 thousand liters of raw sewage to spill into local parks, rivers, and on the grounds of the
Hyatt Regency Hotel located nearby [1, 65].
The Slammer Worm discovered in January of 2003 used a buﬀer overﬂow vulnerability found in Microsoft SQL servers to infect servers and propagate over the Internet [16].
It did this indiscriminately, and consequently caused denial of service and general internet
traﬃc congestion around the world. The worm eventually found its way into the DavisBesse Nuclear Power Station in Oak Harbor, Ohio. The worm infected one of the plant’s
contractor computers, which consequently bridged a T1 connection from their computer
to the internal SCADA network of the plant. The worm infected an unpatched server in
the network and caused enough network congestion that it shutdown the Safety Parameter
Display System. The plant continued to operate, though it caused strain on the operators to
get the safety system back up while manually monitoring the safety indicators [16, 35].
Stuxnet became increasingly apparent in the summer of 2010 and is considered the
epitome of a sophisticated cyber-attack, carried out by a more formally-constituted, multidisciplinary “tiger team” [23]. It is the ﬁrst attack of its kind to target ICS implementing
four zero-day exploits with two legitimate, stolen digital-certiﬁcates. Stuxnet propagated
as a worm through the internet and USB ﬂash memory devices to targeted Iranian
nuclear uranium enrichment facilities, such as the Natanz facility. Besides a sophisticated
infection and information gathering strategy, the ultimate goal of Stuxnet was to infect the
Seimens Simatic S7 PLC, injecting altered ladder logic to ruin 1,000 uranium enrichment
centrifuges, all while evading detection [44]. Recent alleged siblings of Stuxnet include
Duqu (2011) [4] and Flame (2012) [53].
Shamoon targeted the state owned Saudi Aramco Energy Company, the world’s largest
oil company, in August of 2012 [7, 17]. This cyber-attack eﬀectively wiped 30,000
computers from Aramco and disabled some of its internal networks for weeks. A hacker
group called the Cutting Sword of Justice and Arab Youth Group claimed responsibility for
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the attack. It appears the only motive was to delete company data by erasing hard drives and
corrupting the master boot record of the infected computers, causing maximum disruption
along with replacing some ﬁles with pictures of a burning US ﬂag [66]. Business processes
were aﬀected, possible production was lost, and the virus spread to other oil and gas ﬁrms
such as RasGas [7]. Although this attack did not speciﬁcally focus on SCADA systems,
the target focus is on critical infrastructure.
All of these incidents highlight the necessity to drastically increase critical infrastructure protection. The United States Congress drafted the Cybersecurity Act of 2012 [38],
with the intent of fostering collaborative eﬀorts between private industry and government
to solve an increasing vulnerability to the nation’s critical infrastructure. The act allows
for private sector industrial companies to voluntarily share information with the U.S. government in exchange for improved situational awareness of cyber-security threats across
critical infrastructure sectors. The legislation is intended to reduce the cyber threat knowledge gap for critical infrastructure sectors and provide momentum towards solving these
issues collectively. Since many private sector companies historically do not report cyberattacks, the legislation is a mechanism that will incentivize reporting [67].
Later in the same year, former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta addressed the
United States, particularly speaking to private businesses and industry about the growing
cyber-threat [67]. He highlighted that the United States cannot wait for an Electronic
Pearl Harbor to occur and do nothing to prevent it. Secretary Panetta spoke out to gain
private industry support for the cyber-security act, and to place pressure on law makers to
pass the legislation. Mcgraw and others [47, 52] emphasized that although government
and cyber-security policies around the world are making forward progress, network
complexity, extensibility, and connectivity will continue to abound with technology as a
whole. Additionally, as these factors increase, ﬂaws in software will cause vulnerabilities
to increase as a result.
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Industry has developed a variety of commercial oﬀ-the-shelf (COTS) products,
diverse protocols, and ubiquitous information technology (IT) security solutions to address
growing security threats; however security issues continue to persist. SCADA systems
remain diﬃcult to secure because of a growing diversity of SCADA hardware platforms
and software protocols, the persistence of legacy systems which are vulnerable to newer
threats, and the limitations of security practices on the SCADA network due to resource
and demand constraints. Furthermore, it is estimated that there are currently 150 to 200
diﬀerent SCADA protocols [29].
The large diversity of proprietary SCADA equipment and protocols appear to oﬀer
security because an attacker would have to learn a variety of diﬀerent protocols to be
able to aﬀect an entire SCADA system. Notwithstanding, security through obscurity is
generally thought of as a weak security practice [47]. Industry is increasingly adopting
international open standard network protocols that negate the diversity paradigm [29]. This
consolidation of communication protocols results in a streamlined eﬀort of protecting a
networked system, but also reduces the amount of familiarity with SCADA protocols
required by an attacker to penetrate a SCADA system[14, 56]. Considering the security
gaps created by diverse platforms and protocols, standardized and non-standardized
systems, and modern devices interconnected with legacy devices, it is clear that achieving
a comprehensive security program for critical infrastructure will prove diﬃcult [11, 29].
Nevertheless, current security models do incorporate defense-in-depth strategies to
SCADA networks [10, 14, 20, 34]. Most SCADA security models include perimeter
defense (e.g., ﬁrewalls and proxies), network intrusion detection systems (IDS) and
intrusion prevention systems (IPS), workstation anti-virus products, computer use policies,
and physical security policies. The concept of defense-in-depth is based on the idea that
successive layers of protection will provide adequate protection for the system even if
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the outside layer is breached [34, 41]. In defending computer networks, however, the
compromise of any element may result in the compromise of the entire system.
To compound matters, not all components of a SCADA network are capable of
being adequately secured with this current approach [8, 51, 71]. PLC and RTU devices
are vulnerable to security threats because of their inability to detect malicious activity
or prevent malicious actions from being passed to the cyber-physical components they
are connected to. A skilled attacker with minimal resources may be able to alter PLC
ﬁrmware, maintain a persistent presence on the network, and is capable of causing longer
lasting damage without their participation [3]. This also makes it diﬃcult for security
professionals to ascertain the origin of the problem. Simply querying the PLC device is not
suﬃcient since it may contain modiﬁed code with the purpose of evading detection [49].
This problem would require an analysis of the ﬁrmware itself to determine if it has been
altered, to include investigating the speciﬁc eﬀects of the modiﬁcation.
Each organization has freedom to implement their IT strategy as they see ﬁt. For
example, the Department of Defense (DOD) and private industry have similar but diﬀerent
motivations that guide their decisions for implementing security. The DOD is mission
oriented and bases its security policies on national security and operational requirements
[18, 19]. Money is a factor for the DOD but not a driving one. With private industry,
money is a primary inﬂuential driving factor. Other factors that are catalysts for change
include safety, regulations, and legal liability [6, 31]. SCADA infrastructure is designed
to last for many years, possibly even decades before being upgraded or replaced, and is
expensive to maintain [6]. Another concern to industry is the long-term support to their
systems. As stated earlier, it is a general practice to keep a large stock of components
such as sensors and PLCs that will last the company many years. This unique situation
introduces the mixture of legacy systems with modern systems. Having a security solution
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that spans modern and legacy systems is a pervasive security problem, since one solution
may not apply to all SCADA devices.
Another security issue that stems from legacy systems is long-term system support.
SCADA systems are long-term systems with embedded devices that use a particular
software application, operating system, or ﬁrmware for possibly a decade or longer. A
company who originally provided software support for upgrading and patch management
may no longer exist due to closing or absorption by another company who discontinues
support [6]. Another concern is that some software may continue to be supported, but a new
update may break support for legacy software, which in turn may cause the legacy software
to stop working. Due to the real-time demands of SCADA systems, system administrators
may choose to avoid patching their systems altogether to skirt this issue [34].
SCADA systems have seen an emergence of high bandwidth connectivity and network
throughput in recent years [9, 36]. Along with the demand of continuous operations,
system administrators have integrated their corporate local area networks (LAN) to their
SCADA networks. This is an eﬀort to increase eﬃciency and productivity, but also
introduced another attack vector for attackers to gain a foothold into the corporate LAN and
eventually to the SCADA network [29]. In fact, between 2001 and 2006, 70% of security
incidents involving SCADA networks originated outside of the network [9, 29]. This is
a signiﬁcant increase from previous years where that same percentage is due to inside
accidents and operator error. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Industrial
Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) recently published in their
quarterly newsletter (October-December 2013) [27] that they had responded to over 200
cyber-incidents across all critical infrastructure sectors; with 53% of the incidents focusing
on the energy sector in just the ﬁrst half of the ﬁscal year. This emergence of focused
targeted incidents, coupled with the shortage of qualiﬁed cyber-security professionals in
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the public sector [62] and increased networking of cyber-physical devices, is a cause for
concern.
Another security concern is the unrestricted access to emerging wireless RTUs and
wireless ﬁeld devices. Physical security is a concern particularly for unattended remote
sites, where an attacker can access the site and modify, add, or destroy equipment. With
wireless devices, an attacker can insert themselves in the traﬃc, or monitor the network
traﬃc to gain information. Although water towers operate under a licensed FCC frequency,
this does not inhibit someone from listening to those frequencies and learning information.
The protocols involved were designed with eﬃciency and backwards compatibility in mind,
not security and conﬁdentiality. Data ﬂows between wireless modems unencrypted. An
attacker can use a program such as Airsnort or Wireshark to sniﬀ protocol packets and
decipher protocols and useful information such as user-names or passwords to computer
workstations or PLC devices.
The security issues discussed above is categorized and listed below to summarize
security weaknesses and their associated threats [11, 34]:
• External Network Defense:
Control – SCADA systems have entry attack vectors that include modems, wireless
devices, and the internal corporate LAN. A gateway translates modern TCP/IP
connections to SCADA protocols to allow access to the SCADA network remotely.
Many gateways do not have security features .

Also, a lack of multi-factor

authentication allows attackers to crack the only defense of access control and
that is usually weak passwords. Attack vectors include: war dialing, wireless
jamming, man-in-the-middle attacks, brute-force password guessing or credentialreplay attacks [11].
Perimeter Defense – SCADA systems lack public-facing ﬁrewalls that are capable
of understanding SCADA protocols and ﬁltering traﬃc accordingly.
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IDS/ IPS

devices currently cannot monitor suspicious SCADA protocols entering the network.
Attack vectors include: PLC/RTU spooﬁng, wireless device spooﬁng, wormhole
attacks which can lead to key-compromise and theft [56, 59].
• Internal Network Defense:– IDS/IPS devices placed in SCADA networks currently
cannot monitor suspicious SCADA protocols inside the network or below the
RTU/PLC layer.

Attack vectors include: PLC/RTU spooﬁng, wireless device

spooﬁng, wormhole attacks, sybil attacks, replication, routing loops, denial of service
and information stealing [56].
• Cyber-Physical Devices, Servers and Workstations:
Protocol Security – SCADA protocols do not have built in security and can therefore
be spoofed and easily sniﬀed in plain-text (no encryption or authentication). Attack
vectors include: sybil attacks (forged identities), replication, routing loops, denial of
service, time-synchronization attacks, slander-attacks for role based authentication
schemes [12, 29].
Device and OS Security – Resource constraints placed on PLCs and RTUs makes it
diﬃcult to apply security techniques that would defend against or recognize attacks
[11, 15]. Out-dated operating systems are vulnerable to known exploits and may be
made a pivot for a future attack [34, 54].
Though these threats are formidable, many of these attacks have been addressed
successfully in modern IT networks. The key to applying security solutions is to analyze
the threats based on their impact and appropriately implementing controls that give the
maximum amount of risk control for the organizations conﬁdentiality, integrity, and
availability requirements [19, 34]. Another consideration is the placement of security
solutions based on their hardware/software trust relationship assumptions [14, 59]. New
hardware and software solutions will need realization to meet these unique problems.
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PLCs, like any other computer device, assume hardware/software trust relationships that
must be understood and protected [55].
2.4

Previous Work on PLC Firmware Analysis
With respect to information assurance (IA) there have been few discussions and

security implementations regarding detection of malware or attacks on PLC ﬁrmware. One
researcher addresses external PLC ﬁrmware veriﬁcation on an external device connected
to the PLC [30]. A ﬁeld programmable gate array (FPGA) security appliance is loaded
with software that attests the validity of PLC ﬁrmware using a SHA1 hashing algorithm to
compare ﬁrmware hash signatures. Figure 2.3 illustrates this functionality below.

Figure 2.3: Khan’s FPGA/PLC Control Flow [30]
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A secondary beneﬁt to computing blocked hash checks is the ability to locate
mismatched-signature hash blocks, which narrows down the search for detecting modiﬁed
ﬁrmware. Though the appliance is not able to restore corrupted ﬁrmware, the FPGA is
able to prevent the PLC from executing modiﬁed ﬁrmware. Once the PLC is restored to
its original software, using outside methods from the security appliance, the restored PLC
ﬁrmware is re-validated and allowed to resume. The security device is attached directly to
the PLC and not in-line between the SCADA network and PLC. This research highlights
detection of modiﬁed code using an external device, and addresses the PLC ﬁrmware as
a possible attack vector. The author does concede that the security device’s inability to
restore modiﬁed ﬁrmware may be considered a form of denial-of-service and undermines
the availability of the PLC itself.
Another research eﬀort developed software based ﬁrmware validation to verify
ﬁrmware updates being uploaded to a PLC from an engineer workstation [49]. Figure
2.4 illustrates the experiment set up. The hardware/software trust relationship above the
PLC is seen as an attack vector leading to the PLC and assumed to be compromised. The
security objective of the research is to identify modiﬁed ﬁrmware before it is downloaded
to a PLC during a ﬁrmware update.

The proof of concept experiment utilized the

Allen-Bradley DF1 protocol. DF1 is a byte-oriented Allen-Bradley speciﬁc data-link
layer protocol that combines features of data transparency and two-way simultaneous
transmissions with embedded responses of the ANSI x3.28 speciﬁcation [2]. The validation
software incorporates a ﬁrmware hash validation mechanism to verify the ﬁrmwares hash
signature while in-transit. The software is trained with an original ﬁrmware ﬁle and then
determines if a suspect ﬁrmware ﬁle is modiﬁed while the suspect ﬁrmware is uploaded.
This approach contributes PLC ﬁrmware modiﬁcation detection using a binary detection
classiﬁer: (Yes/No) classiﬁcation prior to a PLC ﬁrmware update.
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Figure 2.4: McMinn’s Passive Capture and Baseline Analysis Experiment [50]

Basnight et al. [3] took a deeper look at PLC ﬁrmware modiﬁcation by using
reverse engineering techniques to determine the ﬁrmware’s security protection schema for
detecting ﬁrmware modiﬁcations. They argue that security in the PLC is non-existent, and
that a check-sum algorithm in the ﬁrmware only serves to ensure that the ﬁrmware is not
corrupted, and is incapable of preventing or detecting an intentional modiﬁcation to the
ﬁrmware. Basnight’s reverse engineering technique to identify vulnerabilities associated
with the ﬁrmware update process resulted in a successful exploit. The reverse engineering
process for ﬁrmware is illustrated in Figure 2.5 below. The ﬁrmware is wrapped in an
executable ﬁle provided by the manufacturer’s website is then extracted and analyzed. The
technique used to analyze the ControlLogix L61 PLC provided useful details concerning
the L61 ﬁrmware structure, functionality, and the language of the processor. Once the
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ﬁrmware is analyzed and an attack vector is selected based on the upload process, they
successfully altered Allen-Bradley PLC ﬁrmware version number, recalculated the checksum and CRC codes, and then successfully installed the modiﬁed ﬁrmware onto the PLC
using only commercially available tools from the manufacturer. This proof of concept
strengthens the argument for the need to improve critical infrastructure protection. At
this juncture, two research techniques demonstrate that modiﬁcation to PLC ﬁrmware is
detectable and that ﬁrmware modiﬁcation is feasible. However, these approaches do not
provide insight as to the nature of the ﬁrmware modiﬁcation.

Figure 2.5: Basnight’s Firmware Reverse Engineering Process [3]

Sickendick [64] researched ﬁle carving and statistical analysis techniques which detect
and classify ﬁle types and ﬁrmware architectures. Using a ﬁrmware disassembly algorithm,
Sickendick determined that the L61 PLC ﬁrmware is uncompressed and that the majority
of the ﬁrmware is instruction code, with little data. Several classiﬁer algorithms and ﬁle
segmenter algorithms are tested in a system to determine the most eﬃcient and accurate
algorithms that will be used in an automated ﬁrmware disassembly and ﬁle identiﬁcation
method. The ﬁrmware disassembly system is then evaluated as a whole system via
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simulation in order to validate the system and characterize real world PLC ﬁrmware. The
ﬁrmware disassembly system and parameters are shown in Figure 2.6 below.

Figure 2.6: Sickendick’s Firmware Disassembly System [64]

A notable metric of the classiﬁers tested is their accuracy, which is measured using
true positives, true negatives, false positives, and false negative rates. Furthermore, the
time required to train each classiﬁer is considered as well. For example, the normalized
compression distance (NCD) algorithm ﬁle type classiﬁer, only achieved a true positive
rate of 11.1% overall. In a case where all 12 ﬁle types needed to be classiﬁed, the algorithm
required approximately 76 days of training on data prior to classiﬁcation [64]. Single
ﬁle type classiﬁcation training ranged from three to seven days. Time and accuracy were
considered for selecting the ﬁrmware dissassembly system algorithms. This research steps
closer toward ﬁrmware analysis with respect to opcode and ﬁle type classiﬁcation. It is
important to PLC ﬁrmware reverse engineering by providing a technique for classiﬁcation
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and its capabilities are useful for ﬁrmware modiﬁcation analysis when dealing with
unknown ﬁrmware ﬁle types.
Lim & Lee [39] created a methodology for forensic analysis of embedded systems.
They proposed a two prong approach that involves hardware component and trace analysis
along with software comparison analysis based on manufacturer speciﬁcations.

The

software analysis focuses on comparisons of ﬁrmware revision numbers (FRN), computer
system conﬁgurations, directory conﬁgurations, ﬁle/ﬁrmware formats, log ﬁles, time-lines,
meta data, and others with the manufacturers speciﬁcations. Once changes have been
identiﬁed, the analyst can investigate the changes made in a speciﬁc category. Although
this research provides a framework for understanding forensic analysis of embedded
systems, there is a critical assumptions made on the reliance of input from industry.
They admit that their software analysis approach assumes industry cooperation to provide
proprietary data sheets and functionality inventories of the code, which focuses the analysis
scope at structured code layers above the operating system or ﬁrmware level to the
application and ﬁle system level. Without this assumption, the software analysis process is
constrained to operate a reverse engineering perspective which must be accomplished at the
assembly instruction level ﬁrst, then abstracting upwards towards understanding the syntax
diﬀerences of the application and operating system equivalents. Although Lim and Lee’s
research provides an overarching starting point of forensic analysis for embedded systems,
however a technique for ﬁrmware modiﬁcation analysis is not presented.
2.5

Current Firmware Analysis Tools and Techniques
Software is normally written in high level languages such as Python, C++, and Java,

and then converted into low level machine code for the computer processor to execute.
Other programs that require speed and eﬃciency (e.g., ﬁrmware) are written in lower level
assembly languages for microprocessor architectures such as ARM, PowerPC, and Intel
and subsequently converted into machine code. These lower level languages require more
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in-depth knowledge of the computer system architecture compared to high level languages,
which abstracts these aspects away from the programmer, and require specialized tools and
techniques [21, 22, 26]. If the source code and binary mapping of the ﬁrmware is provided
to the analyst, the analysis of the software is straight forward, and the analyst may view
the source code using an appropriate program language editor/viewer. In the event that
the architecture or binary mapping of the ﬁrmware is unknown, reverse engineering tools
and techniques are utilized ﬁrst to ascertain the architecture and map the functionality of
the ﬁrmware and its salient features [68]. Once this step is complete, the analyst can then
proceed to determine the ﬁrmware’s software behavior and structure. Reverse engineering
tools speciﬁcally focused on assembly code and binary ﬁles are discussed along with the
techniques that implement them.
2.5.1

Techniques.

The goals of reverse engineering techniques are to derive approximations of software
behavior and source code syntax [68]. Not having the original source code implies the
need to reverse the process to derive original source code from machine code; from a low
level language to high level language again. Software contains both syntax, which dictates
instructions to be carried out by the microprocessor; and semantics, which governs the
software’s intended states of behavior [22, 68]. These two aspects are discovered using
static and dynamic analysis techniques.
2.5.1.1

Static Analysis.

Static analysis of a binary ﬁle seeks to uncover the syntax structure of the ﬁle without
executing the program code [68]. Many aspects of the ﬁle are determined such as the
language of the architecture (e.g., ARM instructions), determining encoded ﬁles and data
such as pictures or video that are embedded in the ﬁle, and mapping functionality and
program ﬂow. Control ﬂow graphs and call graphs may be created, in order to build upon
for dynamic analysis. Static analysis is generally performed ﬁrst, especially if the ﬁle
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details are not known prior to analysis. The analyst must ascertain all of the possible states
of the source code before the behavior can be understood [22, 68]. The end state of static
analysis is to derive a facsimile of the original source code.
2.5.1.2

Dynamic Analysis.

Dynamic analysis of a binary ﬁle seeks to uncover its behavior by executing the
program code. This technique seeks to determine how the states of the program changes
from one execution point to the next [68]. It takes into consideration the change in data
values and how that alters the ﬂow of the program. With the static analysis all ﬂow paths
were given as possible paths, however in dynamic analysis only one ﬂow path will be
taken based on the execution of register values and data conditions. Dependencies can
be discovered, which may lead to uncovering vulnerabilities as a result. This technique
captures the conditional relationship between states [68].
Both techniques allow the analyst a method for reverse engineering software to extract
its original intended source code and understand its behavior. This task is considered
non-trivial [21]. This research, limits the scope of ﬁrmware comparison to static analysis
because it is non trivial, and because of the additional task of performing these techniques
simultaneously while comparing the ﬁles side-by-side for diﬀerences.
2.5.2

Tools.

The tools presented below, perform aspects of static analysis on binary ﬁrmware ﬁles.
They are not all inclusive in terms of representation, but are common examples. Some are
more versatile than others and each has unique functions and capabilities. A single tool is
adequate for the task when performing static analysis on a single ﬁle; however, comparing
two ﬁrmware ﬁles may require multiple tools to aid the analyst in the comparison.
2.5.2.1

HxD.

HxD [28] is a free versatile hexadecimal code viewer and editor. Its main purpose is to
display hexadecimal code and data from a ﬁle, and displays its ASCII equivalent side-by-
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side with the hex code on a single screen. Providing the ASCII equivalent characters near
the hexadecimal values provides an indication of human-readable string texts in the ﬁle.
HxD is also an editor, which means the data ﬁle is writable, regardless of ﬁle type, since it
is written back to the ﬁle in binary format. This tool is capable of comparing binary ﬁles
side-by-side (Figure 2.7), and also performs statistical frequency analysis for individual
hexadecimal bytes (Figure 2.8). If an analyst were to use this tool for ﬁle comparison,
they must scroll through the code and determine how the programs diﬀers manually; the
tool does not indicate diﬀerences. The frequency histogram shown in Figure 2.8 provides
a hexadecimal ﬁngerprint for a ﬁle at the byte level. Each byte is comprised of two letters
like 0xA0 and is counted for each instance in the ﬁle, accounting for bytes ranging from
00 to FF. When a speciﬁc histogram bar is hovered over, the histogram bar turns red and
displays the count for that particular byte.

Figure 2.7: HxDs Side-by-Side Code Comparison View [28]
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Figure 2.8: HxD’s Hexadecimal Byte Histogram [28]

2.5.2.2

VBinDiﬀ.

Short for Visual Binary Diﬀerence [43], this is a free command-line program that is
supported by Linux, Mac, and Windows. It has two features: (1) display a single ﬁle in its
hexadecimal form, and (2) compare two binary ﬁles. The byte diﬀerences are highlighted
in red as shown in Figure 2.9. This tool provides a visual diﬀerence view similar to HxD.
One eﬀect worth noting is the comparison of two ﬁles who have a displacement diﬀerence
(e.g., additions or subtractions). If code were inserted into one ﬁle contrary to the other,
all of the data to the right of the insertion would show red inclusively. This is due to byte
alignment comparison.
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Figure 2.9: VBinDiﬀ Program Comparing Two L61 PLC Firmware Files [43]

2.5.2.3

IDA Pro.

IDA Pro [25] is a versatile and robust disassembler viewer and debugger, which
displays hexadecimal code and the actual instructions based on architecture speciﬁcations.
IDA Pro is commercially licensed software. It contains scripting command language, IDC,
which allows the user to expand the functionality of the program with custom scripts to
aide in ﬁle processing. One example of the usage of scripts is to identify functions in the
PLC ﬁrmware. The program eﬀectively disassembles the ﬁrmware (Figure 2.10), but it
cannot anticipate every binary ﬁle format layout. When the L61 ﬁrmware is opened, IDA
Pro is not able to resolve the function names of the program and created automatically
numbered names. An analyst may not recognize the intent of a function if the function
name is replaced by a number. With the script command-line, a script can be created
to identify each function and re-display the ﬁrmware ﬁle with the newly found function
names. Firmware analysis can begin after the code is prepared to gain as much information
as possible. VBinDiﬀ and HxD can be used in conjunction with IDA Pro to investigate
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changes in a suspected ﬁrmware ﬁle from the original. IDA Pro does not allow side-byside ﬁle comparison, and only allows a single program to be analyzed.

Figure 2.10: IDA Pro Program Displaying a Disassembled L61 Firmware Function [25]

2.6

Summary
This chapter covered an introduction to PLC functionality along with general SCADA

security issues and PLC security issues. Industry is reluctant to adopt some IT security
standard practices because they disrupt safety and availability of data and services in
these systems. This is caused by the misalignment of IA objectives between Industry
and the generic IT solutions. In order to achieve a comprehensive security solution for
PLCs, a strategy must be developed for detecting security threats, reacting to threats,
preventing threats, and restoring services from disruptions in a way that addresses PLC
availability and integrity of data. The related works covered PLC ﬁrmware classiﬁcation,
ﬁrmware modiﬁcation detection, and PLC security vulnerabilities. Assuming a PLC is
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compromised, ﬁrmware reverse engineering tools and techniques are required to perform
modiﬁcation analysis to uncovering intentional/unintentional modiﬁcations. This type of
analysis is currently a manual process with speciﬁc tools and techniques which aide and
shape the process. Tools that automatically compare ﬁles highlight changes made and
characterize the diﬀerences at the hexadecimal byte level. Chapter 3 describes how this
research implements a technique that detects and characterizes ﬁrmware modiﬁcations,
while Chapter 4 describes how this research validates its results.
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III.

Methodology

In this chapter, the methodology of ﬁrmware modiﬁcation analysis is covered. The
research goals, experimental setup, and ﬁrmware selection criteria are explained. The
scope, assumptions, and limitations are covered under research goals, and validation and
approach are covered under the experimental setup section. Chapter four will cover the
speciﬁc test cases that will evaluate the technique.
3.1

Research Goals
Much of the research and issues discussed in chapter two applies to defense-in-

depth strategies that prevents malware or disruptions from eventually eﬀecting the PLC’s
operations. Assuming that security has failed to protect the PLC, it is conceivable that
an attacker may install modiﬁed ﬁrmware onto a PLC once inside the SCADA network.
Acting on this assumption, the main goal of this research is to develop a technique that
detects and characterizes PLC ﬁrmware modiﬁcations. Therefore, the main research
question asked is how can PLC ﬁrmware modiﬁcations be detected and how does one
characterize the nature of the modiﬁcations?
From this main question, additional questions are asked to further illicit details
regarding detection and characterization. With respect to detection two questions are asked:
(1) Was a modiﬁcation made?, and (2) does the size comparison of the two ﬁles diﬀer?
These two questions relate to the ﬁrst part of the main research question.
Concerning characterization, several questions are asked to understand the nature of
the modiﬁcation, if it has occured: (1) What is added or deleted to the suspect ﬁrmware
ﬁle compare to the baseline?, (2) What opcode characteristics changed?, (3) Where is code
changed in the ﬁrmware?, and ﬁnally (4) what functionality is modiﬁed, added, or deleted
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to the suspect ﬁle? These two questions relate to the second part of the main research
question.
The overall approach to detect and characterize modiﬁed ﬁrmware is to compare a
suspect ﬁrmware ﬁle to a baseline ﬁrmware ﬁle. This baseline is the known-good standard,
and the suspected ﬁrmware represents ﬁrmware that may have been modiﬁed on a PLC.
Both ﬁles undergo several tests that compares the tests’ results. Next, strategies that answer
the speciﬁc questions are discussed.
3.1.1

Detecting Modiﬁcations.

To detect modiﬁcations made to the suspect ﬁle two tests are performed. The ﬁrst test
hashes the base and suspect ﬁles separately, then compares the hashes to determine if they
diﬀer. This test is performed twice using two hashing methods. The second test is the ﬁle
size comparison and displays the ﬁle sizes of both ﬁles, and indicates if the ﬁles are the
same size or diﬀerent sizes, and which ﬁle is larger or smaller. Each test is explained in
further detail.
3.1.1.1

Hashing the Firmware Files.

The process of hashing involves a bit-wise operation on ﬁxed blocks of an entire ﬁle,
producing a smaller ﬁxed-length digest represented as hexadecimal characters [70]. In
eﬀect, hashing produces a unique signature for a given ﬁle. Diﬀerent hashing algorithms
have diﬀerent advantages and disadvantages to their use. The hash test performed uses
cryptographic hashing, since the algorithm consistently produces unique hash signatures
for diﬀerent inputs [70]. It is possible, though rare, that identical digests (collision) can
result from hashing two diﬀerent ﬁles, but with most cryptographic hashes this is not a
concern since the possibility is so remote. This is not to confuse the fact that an attacker
would try to create a modiﬁed ﬁle, such that hashing it would produce an identical digest
to the hashed original ﬁle; this possibility is even more remote than a random collision [70,
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p.219]. Using two separate hash techniques on each ﬁle ensures that this issue would be
reduced to a remote possibility, and that modiﬁcation detection is almost certain.
It seems that having the same SHA algorithm with diﬀerent hash lengths could
potentially be circumvented if a collision is found for one method, say SHA256, and
produces the same resulting hash for the SHA512 method. This is not the case, since
SHA256 and SHA512 have diﬀerent key space sizes. A collision found for SHA256 does
not produce the same collision for SHA512, though they use the same algorithm to compute
the hash. An alternative method of using two diﬀerent cryptographic hashing algorithms
would have the same eﬀect.
Hashing is permutation-sensitive, meaning that rearranging the same combination of
opcodes in a diﬀerent order produces diﬀerent hashes. This property is tested in Figure
3.1 below. Four instructions are hashed, and then rearranged in a diﬀerent order and
hashed again. Both hashes turn out to be diﬀerent. This is critical to the initial step of
detecting diﬀerences in the base and suspect ﬁrmware, and later in the diﬀerence analysis
process, where functions are hashed to retain their identity even if it is shifted in the suspect
ﬁrmware. Matching the order of the data in both binary ﬁles is important in determining
modiﬁcation detection, and is proven eﬀective using cryptographic hash functions.

Figure 3.1: Hash Test Done With Two Permutations of Opcodes
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The ﬁrst comparison done with the two ﬁrmware ﬁles is a hash comparison. Two
binary ﬁles are hashed separately using SHA256, their digests compared, then the ﬁles are
hashed a second time using SHA512 and their digests compared again. If digests match
both times, the ﬁles are identical; if they do not match even once, the suspect ﬁrmware ﬁle
has been altered. This method is a quick and eﬀective way of determining if the two ﬁles
are identical without going through the entire analysis process. This test saves precious
time if the ﬁles prove to be identical since no further testing would be required.
3.1.1.2

File Size Comparison.

Both baseline and suspect ﬁles are sized using bytes as the standard measurement. It
seems that kilobytes is a suﬃcient standard measurement to compare the ﬁles, however
it is foreseeable that a simple four byte addition to a larger ﬁle may be missed due to
rounding. Once each ﬁle is sized separately, their sizes are compared and determined to be
equal or diﬀerent, where the suspect ﬁle is larger or smaller than the baseline. Knowing
this information may yield clues later in determining the nature of the modiﬁcation with
respect to their size diﬀerence. The sizes of the ﬁrmware ﬁles is used as inputs to the
opcode comparisons and functionality comparison steps later on. Assuming the hash test
concludes that the suspect diﬀers from the baseline, ﬁle size indicates only four possible
characterizations: (1) modiﬁcations to the suspect only, (2) additions to the suspect, (3)
deletions to the suspect, and (4) a combination of all or some additions, deletions, and
modiﬁcations.
3.1.2

Characterizing the Nature of Modiﬁcations.

Once modiﬁcation is detected between the baseline and suspect ﬁrmware, other
tests will characterize the nature of the modiﬁcation in terms of opcode characteristics,
opcode diﬀerences, and functionality diﬀerences. At this point, only details about the
diﬀerences are ascertained. No eﬀort is made to classify the diﬀerences as malicious or
intentional. Prior to characteristic comparison, disassembling the baseline and suspect
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ﬁrmware ﬁles is required. The disassembly will produce instructions or opcodes in the
launguage of the microprocessor architecture, then the characteristics can be compared at
the instruction level. It is believed that comparing the instructions from the baseline and
suspect enables the characterization of modiﬁcation. After all, executable ﬁrmware ﬁles
contain a combination of instructions and data in binary format that are interpreted and
executed by the microprocessor of the PLC. The characterization methods are described
below.
3.1.2.1

Opcode Histogram Comparison.

Like a ﬁle’s unique signature given by a digest, each ﬁrmware version in a speciﬁc
architecture contains speciﬁc amounts of instructions. Not all ﬁles contain every instruction
found in the instruction set; rather a ﬁle is uniquely identiﬁed by the varying amounts of
instructions and amounts of each instruction type. Note that the entire binary ﬁle image
is not solely assembly instructions, and contains a mixture of assembly instructions and
data, such as strings. The ARM7TDMI instruction set for example contains 48 diﬀerent
instructions with numerous combinations of 32 bit opcodes based on the placement of
registers, addresses, and conditions after the instruction [26, 40]. The opcode counts
indicate the extent to which the two ﬁrmware diﬀer. Figure 3.2 illustrates this concept.

Figure 3.2: Histogram Displaying Contrasting Opcode Counts for Two Firmware Files
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As each ﬁle is disassembled, a running count of each instruction decoded is tabulated.
A single array holds the tabulated counts for each instruction and is representative of every
instruction found in a particular instruction set. This proof of concept model only contains
one instruction set, namely ARM. That means that the histogram chart represents all 48
instructions and contains a count of each instruction as the ﬁle is disassembled. Once an
entire ﬁle is disassembled, the ﬁnal count creates the histogram chart in Figure 3.2.
The opcode histogram comparison represents the opcode characteristics of the
baseline and suspect ﬁrmware in terms of opcode combinations. The destination registers,
source registers and other conditions found in the parsed instruction are not accounted for
in this method but are accounted for in the opcode comparison portion. This comparison
visualizes the opcode combination diﬀerences; whether it is a single instruction change, or
many instruction changes. This also gives an indication of the extent of the modiﬁcation
made to the ﬁrmware.
The histogram bars become diﬃcult to diﬀerentiate visually as the number of opcodes
increases. As opcode counts reach into the thousands, scaling becomes a problem, and
minute diﬀerences may be missed. A second histogram solves this issue by subtracting
the base histogram counts from the suspect histogram counts. This histogram delta,
or diﬀerence, allows a visualization of opcode diﬀerences that is scaled for improved
diﬀerence-recognition. For this histogram chart, equal baseline and suspect histogram
counts results in zero counts for each opcode instruction in the array. Any diﬀerences
between the base and suspect will result in a positive or negative histogram bar. A
positive histogram bar count indicates that the suspect has more instructions, and a negative
histogram bar count indicates that the base has a higher instruction count for that particular
opcode. Figure 3.3 illustrates the delta histogram.
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Figure 3.3: Histogram of the Diﬀerence Between Base and Suspect Histogram Counts

There are two instructions that distinguish subroutines and functions [26], and their
histogram diﬀerences may indicate additions or deletions between the suspect and baseline.
The Store Multiple (STM) and Load Multiple (LDM) opcodes are the prologues and
epilogues to individual functions found speciﬁcally in the L61 ﬁrmware. These opcodes
are used to save and restore registers on and oﬀ the stack. If there is a diﬀerence in
these two speciﬁc instruction counts, it may indicate functionality diﬀerences, though their
counts being identical does not counter the indication. Some functions do not contain these
instructions at all.
In conjunction with this type of alteration, Branch instructions (B) are modiﬁed
in order to reference added functions, or to prevent functions from being executed. If
branching instructions are modiﬁed, it may indicate that an attacker used hooks to reroute
functionality to their custom functions and then return the ﬂow of control to the original
function. The histogram count cannot solely determine subroutine modiﬁcations because of
non-standard code structure. However, it does oﬀer opcode characteristics comparisons for
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opcode combinations, and may be used in conjunction with other comparisons to ascertain
the nature of the modiﬁcation.
3.1.2.2

Opcode Diﬀerence Comparison.

Comparing two ﬁles side-by-side to determine instruction diﬀerences is a straight
forward comparison. If the baseline and suspect are identical, there should be no diﬀerence
between each instruction at each speciﬁc address. To achieve this comparison, each
ﬁle is disassembled into opcode instructions that contain speciﬁc source and destination
registers, or immediate values, depending on the type of instruction. A list stores the
entire disassembled instructions for each ﬁle and includes the address (e.g., 0x000008),
raw four-byte hexadecimal data, opcode type (e.g., ’B’) , and the entire disassembled
instruction (e.g., BEQ &24C9F8). The opcode type ﬁeld in the list is used in the histogram
comparison done earlier. All of the list items are collected for display purposes, and
the actual comparison is done between the raw bytes at each address. A separate list
is kept to annotate the diﬀerences between lists, appends both lists together, and adds a
True/False indication at the end of the list after the instructions are compared. This way, the
display is able to highlight the diﬀerences in red based on the T/F indicator and display the
information from the baseline and suspect ﬁles, side-by-side. This technique is similar to
the technique used by VBinDiﬀ, with the diﬀerence being that this technique disassembles
hexadecimal bytes into opcodes and compares at the instruction-level vice byte-level.
3.1.2.3

Function Diﬀerence Comparison.

Though comparing instruction diﬀerences is straight forward, comparing functionality
diﬀerences is more complex. Utilizing the same baseline list and suspect list from the
disassembly, this comparison technique builds another data structure similar to a call-graph
for the base and the suspect, then compares the data in a way that determines how the
program ﬂow diﬀers. The selection of the call-graph structure along with the process for
determining modiﬁcations is described below.
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3.1.2.4

Call Graph Structure Selection.

Call-graphs represent the ﬂow of a program from the main program to its functional
components, between functions, and functions returning to the main program again.
The code must be traversed in order to identify functions and the control ﬂow. Once
these features have been identiﬁed they must be cataloged and then compared. Branch
instructions and their address references are cataloged and cross-checked between suspect
and base ﬁles to determine which functions may have been modiﬁed, removed, or added.
It may also be the case that subroutines, not functions were modiﬁed. Subroutines behave
diﬀerently because they have simple branch instructions leading in and out of the subroutine
rather than containing a prologue and epilogue. The main program also behaves like a
subroutine in that it has unconditional branches to other sections of code and does not have
indicators of start and stop code blocks. This challenge weighed heavily on the selection
criteria of the data structure.
There were several data structures to choose from: the lattice, the graph, and the tree.
The data structure selected to perform the function diﬀerence analysis for this comparison
is a call-tree. This structure is selected based on the ﬂexibility and speed it oﬀers for
ﬁrmware traversal. All three structures have a similar approach in traversing software code.
Call-graphs are quite common in analyzing software. Knupfer and Nagel have discussed
using complete call graphs for post-mortem analysis of software programs [32]. Their data
structure utilizes a graph in order to annotate diﬀerences made to a single program over time
for change analysis. A graph is predominately cyclical, meaning that a node in the graph
may have children who can potentially point back to the parent node using another vertex or
have children who point back to the child’s parent, creating a cycle or loop. Consequently,
Knupfer and Nagel only focused their research on higher level programming languages
such as Java, and did not extend their work to cover low level programming languages, like
the ones used to write ﬁrmware.
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Li and Sun discussed combining lattices and graphs in order to conduct impact
analysis on software programs [37]. Their technique uncovers unexpected and potential
side eﬀects caused by software changes. Consequently, [32, 37] both focused on high level
programming languages to conduct their research. These data structures and techniques
are capable of traversing high level program code because of their structured nature. Each
function and subroutine have set epilogues and prologues after they are compiled. This
level of detail is abstracted away since the assembly code does not need to be considered,
only the syntax of the higher level language; which makes the start and stop of functions
very clear and structured. This is not the case with PLC ﬁrmware or modiﬁed ﬁrmware. An
attacker is not bound by compiler rules, and can modify opcodes to suit their purpose and
evade or stiﬂe analyzers.
Maurer eludes to this concept and oﬀers a solution for rearranging low level code
programs to become generalized structured programs [45]. He argues that high level
languages abstract away the details that low level programs implement. Low level programs
are diﬃcult to represent using graphs and lattices because of their high cyclical structure,
and lack of deﬁning code structure like high level programs. He proposes representing
the low level programs using tree structures that take into consideration the loops and
replacing them with artiﬁcial nodes (dead branches) that do not cycle, and then reorganize
the program using the tree in order to eliminate the cyclical ﬂow, and continues to maintain
the intended program ﬂow. He states that:
...every rooted graph may be reordered in such a way that, with respect to
the new order, the only reverse edges are loopbacks. This may be done by
removing all loopbacks, at all levels, from a graph G; it is then not diﬃcult
to show that the resulting graph must be acyclic...which will be useful in
developing a compact representation for loop trees. (Maurer, 2006:231)
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This indicates that deleting loopbacks from a graph essentially creates a tree.
Walkinshaw conﬁrms the use of trees to represent assembly program code ﬂow, and
discusses the limits of static and dynamic analysis techniques [68]. Although it appears
that trees have not been used before to conduct ﬁrmware modiﬁcation analysis, the data
structure is suited for assembly language level programs.
Starting with the base ﬁrmware, a tree node is created as the root and the ﬁrst
instruction of the ﬁrmware is inspected. Consequently, the ﬁrst instruction for the L61
is a branch instruction, which immediately causes the program to populate the tree node
ﬁelds for the root and initiates the call tree process. Not all ﬁrmware have this format, and
may have the initial entry point further into the ﬁle. If ﬁrmware from another PLC type
does not have this same format, the technique can easily be modiﬁed to traverse the ﬁle
until the initial entry point is located. The branch instruction address is calculated in order
to jump to the speciﬁc instruction. Figure 3.4 illustrates the creation and structure of the
tree nodes and the information that each tree node contains.

Figure 3.4: FMAT Call Tree Structure
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A tree node is created when the program encounters a control ﬂow instruction such as
a Branch (B), Branch with Link (BL), or Branch and Exchange (BX) instruction. The tree
node address ﬁelds TO and FROM are updated to reﬂect the address where the control ﬂow
instruction is calling from, and the address the instruction points to. Other ﬁelds in the tree
node such as the HASH, are calculated later once the tree is completely built. Once this
creation occurs another instance of the tree node function is called, becoming a recursive
event. The instruction that the previous control ﬂow instruction pointed to is read and
determined if it is also a control ﬂow instruction. If it is, another tree node is created and
linked to its parent, and ﬁelds updated as before, then recursively calls another instance of
the tree node function.
If the next instruction is not a control ﬂow instruction, the program counter is
incremented, and the next instruction from that function is read. Once a function is
complete, it returns control back to its parent with a return instruction. This returns
control to the previous tree node function and continues to step through its function
until it requests a return and so on. This is equivalent to a push and pop instruction
for manipulating the stack. Subroutines, however, are not bound by this structure and
do not necessarily have prologues or epilogues. Subroutines may terminate with return
instructions or unconditional control ﬂow instructions, so the technique accounts for these
diﬀerences by recognizing the diﬀerent program ﬂow instructions and.
In order to keep the tree acyclic, any branches that point to a previously executed part
of code is given a dead branch. This dead branch is a tree node, but the program does
not jump to the instruction, instead the program completes the STOP ﬁeld with the same
address as the FROM and START ﬁeld, and updates the SIZE ﬁeld with an instruction count
of 1 (just the instruction itself). If cycles were allowed, the program would become trapped
in an inﬁnite loop and would crash the program. Not allowing the program to jump through
previously executed code is essential for this method to work. Pilot studies indicated that
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the entire program terminates when the last dead node (branch to self) is encountered. Once
the last dead node is encountered, return of control is returned to the last function which
terminates the tree node traversal and completes the tree.
At this point, the tree data structure is completed, with the exception of the tree nodes’
HASH ﬁelds. This ﬁeld is ﬁlled on a second traversal of the tree. The hash is calculated for
each node by using its START and STOP ﬁelds to iterate over an existing list of instructions
and updating the hash for each instruction until it reaches the STOP ﬁeld. Each tree node
is visited and its hash ﬁeld updated.
After the tree structure and its nodes are completed, the tree data structure is ﬂattened
into a dictionary for faster comparison. Tree node comparisons done with a tree data
structures would be time consuming due to tree traversal timing. Comparing tree structures
would also be time consuming due to the complexity of comparing diﬀerent tree paths.
This comparison is akin to comparing apples to oranges. Instead, the tree is ﬂattened into a
dictionary, with each tree node being an item entry in the dictionary. A separate dictionary
is created with the entries of the tree nodes added to it. Each node is visited starting with
the root. A parent node is visited and checked if it has children. If the node has children,
the node is added to the dictionary ﬁrst, then the child are visited. This is done until all
nodes are visited on the tree and the separate dictionary contains all of the tree nodes.
The dictionary data structure is composed of keys and values, and each tree node
represents a key/value set. The key is the unique FROM ﬁelds, which is the unique address
each branch instruction originated from. The values associated with the key are the values
of the tree node contained in a tuple (START,HASH). The rest of the tree node ﬁelds STOP
and SIZE are omitted from the value set due to constraints.
Once the baseline and suspect ﬁles are converted to trees, then ﬂattened to dictionaries,
the functionality of the base and suspect is compared. The Keys and values are compared
to determine how the ﬁrmware has been modiﬁed at the function-level. Table 3.1 represents

42

the decision matrix for determining modiﬁcation type based on comparing function
similarities and diﬀerences (intersecting keys and diﬀerence keys).
Table 3.1: Modiﬁcation Decision Matrix
From Address Start Address Hash
Comparison Implication
1
1
1
Identical
1
1
0
Function Modiﬁed
1
0
1
Shifted (same function)
1
0
0
Control Flow Modiﬁed
0
1
1
Control Flow Modiﬁed
0
1
0
Control & Function Modiﬁed
0
0
1
Control Flow Modiﬁed & Shifted
0
0
0
Added,Deleted, or Modiﬁed *
1 = Same, 0 = Diﬀerent, *depending on dictionary

Rows one through four of Table 3.1 represent the intersection of keys from the base
and suspect ﬁrmware. This means that control ﬂow is initiated at the same FROM address
locations. Since the FROM ﬁelds are the same, the START ﬁeld is analyzed. If the START
ﬁelds are the same, it indicates that they point to the same address location where the
function started. The Hash ﬁeld is then checked to determine if the functions are identical,
with respect to the base. If they are identical, then the suspect function is identical to the
base in three aspects: the same FROM-call address, the same function-START address,
and the same function-HASH. Therefore, the control ﬂow for this portion is identical, with
identical functionality. If the hashes are diﬀerent, it indicates that the suspect ﬁrmware has a
modiﬁed function (callee) at the same start location compared to the base. Hash diﬀerences
have implications that aﬀects the decision of the analyzer later in the program. The next
two comparisons from intersecting keys, reveals that the start addresses are diﬀerent and
are either the same function or are diﬀerent functions. Both present unique cases since a
shift indicates added code or added functionality somewhere else in the program. Having
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diﬀerent locations and diﬀerent functionality indicates at a minimum that the ﬂow has been
altered for the caller function. The callee function is modiﬁed if the hash is diﬀerent.
3.1.2.5

Displaying Results.

Once all the diﬀerences are categorized, they are displayed in separate side-by-side
opcode comparison windows. There are a total of four displays for diﬀerence analysis.
The Diﬀerence Analysis HEX view visually depicts the comparison of the ﬁrmware ﬁles
from start to ﬁnish. The Added functions to SUSPECT text view displays additions to
the suspect only, Deleted functions to BASE text view displays deletions to the base only,
and the Modiﬁed functions SUSPECT—BASE text view displays the modiﬁcations made,
comparing suspect and base side-by-side.
3.1.3

Scope, Assumptions, and Limitations.

The scope of this research is limited to static ﬁrmware analysis and not dynamic
analysis. Additionally, time constraints allowed for only one architecture to be explored
for analysis, which is ARM7TDMI (also called ARMv4T). The physical components of the
PLC such as controllers, Ethernet modules, input or output modules are not investigated.
Additionally, it is outside the scope of this research to compare ﬁrmware from diﬀerent
manufacturers and PLC models.
Concerning assumptions, it is assumed that a PLC ﬁrmware has been compromised
and extracted from the PLC for comparison to a known good baseline ﬁrmware. The
baseline ﬁrmware is taken from the original manufacturer website and it is assumed that
it has not been altered from the manufacturer while downloading to the test computer
environments. Downloaded ﬁrmware from the manufacturer’s website on diﬀerent dates
and then comparing them to ensure they are identical at least proves consistency of working
with the same ﬁrmware from the website.
As for limitations, the software tool developed for this research is a proof-of-concept
of the technique. The functionality diﬀerence comparison may not account for all possible
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combinations of function or subroutine instruction epilogues or prologues. This technique
along with the histogram technique provide a guide to the analyst for further investigation.
Also, the disassembler makes no attempt to distinguish code from data and disassembles
each four-bytes read as instructions.
3.2

Experiment Setup
In order to test the eﬀectiveness of the technique outlined in the research goals a

software program is written with the methods described to automate the detection and
characterization process, and allows for the technique to be evaluated. The process of the
experiment is reviewed, followed by a description of the environment that the experiment
runs on. Technical aspects of the experiment are discussed such as the programming
language used for the software program, the reason for using a custom disassembler, and
how the software is tested and validated. Finally a discussion on how the ﬁrmware ﬁle
is obtained is detailed. The next section covers the selection criteria for the PLC and its
ﬁrmware versions.
The baseline and suspect ﬁrmware are compared using the following steps: (1) a hash
comparison, (2) ﬁle size comparison, (3) ﬁngerprint histogram comparison, (4) opcode
diﬀerence comparison, and (5) function diﬀerence comparison. Each step is covered in
greater detail, and the ﬂow diagram outlining these steps are in Figure 3.5 below.
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Figure 3.5: FMAT Program Flow Chart

The ﬁrmware ﬁles are saved to a computer running the Firmware Modiﬁcation
Analysis Tool (FMAT) software. The tool is given the target ﬁles to compare and is
initiated. At that point, the tool executes the steps outlined above and proceeds to analyze
and compare the ﬁrmware ﬁles. As each step is completed, information is displayed
either in the standard output screen or a separate window which the program created. The
program completes and analysis from the analyst may evaluate the results.
3.2.1

Environment.

The testing environment for this research is done using two computers. One computer
is a desktop and the other is a laptop. The desktop computer is conﬁgured with the Windows
7 Enterprise (x64) OS, Intel i7-3770 CPU processor, and 32 GB of DDR3 1333 MHz RAM.
To validate the test results the same experiment is performed on a Dell Precision M4500
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laptop computer conﬁgured with the Windows 7 Enterprise (x64) OS, Intel i7-M640 CPU
processor, and 8 GB of DDR3 800 MHz RAM.
Python 3.3 x64 is is needed to run the FMAT software and is installed on both
computers. Additional packages are installed in Python in order to display graphs in the
tool:
• matplotlib-1.3.1.win-amd64-py3.3.exe with ﬁve dependencies:
- numpy-MKL-1.7.1.win-amd64-py3.3.exe
- pyparsing-2.0.1.win-amd64-py3.3.exe
- python-dateutil-2.1.win-amd64-py3.3.exe
- pytz-2013.7.win-amd64-py3.3.exe
- six-1.4.1.win-amd64-py3.3.exe
3.2.2

Programming Language.

Python 3.3 (x64) is selected as the programming language to code the FMAT software.
It is anticipated that the techniques written would need validation and testing at each
step, which Python is suited to handle. Python can be described as a general-purpose
programming language that blends procedural, functional, and object oriented paradigms
[42]. Its capabilities for graphical user interfaces (GUI), scripting, system programming,
rapid prototyping, and numeric programming are a few examples of why it is selected.
The code produced in Python does not need to be compiled or made into an executable to
run, nor does the entire program need to be syntactically correct to run. Each function in
the program can be tested separately and controlled from a separate script running in the
execution environment. These features accelerated the software development process for
this tool.
3.2.3

Using a Custom Disassembler.

A custom disassembler is written to provide the disassembly capabilities to the
analysis tool. Interfacing with IDA Pro or another software program is considered as an
alternative option. However, IDA Pro is not selected. It is believed that the overhead of
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the requests for each instruction would make the program ineﬃcient. Another reason is the
complexity of IDA Pro. There are many options for disassembly in IDA, and the process
of a disassembly requesting is non-trivial when interfacing python with the IDC scripting
language in IDA. This reinforces the belief that using IDA in conjunction with Python
would increase time to the disassembly process. Interfacing Python to disassemblers
written in other programming languages raises the same issues discussed above.
The disassembler is written in Python with the histogram and opcode diﬀerence comparisons in mind. Although the custom disassembler produces disassembly instructions
like any other disassembler, it produces the instruction in one pass and two parts. The ﬁrst
part takes in four hexadecimal bytes and provides the opcode instruction type, such as ’B’,
while the next part produces the entire instruction, like ’BEQ &27BC9F’. This prevents
additional overhead by parsing the instruction later to ascertain if it is truly a branch type
instruction. One instruction that is confused with a branch using the parsing technique is a
Bit Clear instruction (BIC) which performs a diﬀerent operation. Parsing this incorrectly
introduces false positives. At a minimum, parsings instruction strings still incurs excess
overhead.
3.2.4

Validation and Pilot Testing.

Validating the software tool relies on existing tools such as IDA Pro, Radare, the
Online Disassembler (ODA), VBinDiﬀ, and HxD. Pilot testing is needed to test the
feasibility of implementing the techniques and ascertain the likelihood of successful
validation. Validation is performed for the disassembler, histogram comparisons, and
opcode and function comparisons. For the speciﬁc attack ﬁrmware samples, coordination
and validation is done with the originating author. No prior knowledge is given about the
details of the ﬁrmware attacks. Once the analysis is run on the attack ﬁrmware, the details
are communicated back to the author and veriﬁcation of the results is compared.
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3.2.4.1

Validating the Disassembler.

The custom disassembler is validated against IDA Pro, Radare, and ODA. Each
opcode type for ARM7TDMI is tested, along with all conditions for each opcode type
are tested. Conditions include the condition code ﬁeld, destination register, source register,
operand, immediate operand, shift registers, rotate registers, condition ﬂags, and speciﬁc
bit ﬁelds. Disassembly instructions from the custom disassembler are then cross checked
with ODA and Radare for consistency of displaying the address operands, since IDA Pro
uses additional custom address methods.
3.2.4.2

Validating the Histogram Comparison.

Histogram counts are validated with string searches done in IDA Pro, using a sample
of the opcode types.

For instance, three opcodes are chosen randomly for a cross

comparison. The histogram count for those speciﬁc opcodes are compared with counts
found in IDA Pro. Note that IDA Pro and other disassembly programs cannot distinguish
code from data 100% deﬁnitively. This is a known diﬃcult problem [69]. This aﬀects
the accuracy of IDA Pro’s opcode count, and the custom disassembler’s as well. Since
the custom disassembler is four-byte aligned as it decodes, this provides a degree of
consistency for the opcode histogram and its comparisons. Therefore, this histogram
comparison method serves only as a guide.
Pilot testing for the histogram comparison revealed a scaling issue between the opcode
types. It is diﬃcult to understand opcode diﬀerences between both histogram sets with
large opcode counts. The delta histogram solves this need to diﬀerentiate by displaying the
histogram diﬀerences, which are signiﬁcantly less that the overall opcode counts.
3.2.4.3

Validating the Opcode and Function Comparisons.

Opcode diﬀerences are validated with VBinDiﬀ on all test cases, at the byte-level.
Like the disassembler validation this is a straight forward comparison that matched results.
Like the histogram comparison the function comparison is not 100% deﬁnitive. IDA Pro is
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used to analyze the static program-ﬂow for call graphs, however comparing each call graph
with IDA Pro is a manual comparison and can be error prone. Additionally, the call-tree
function analysis can only be as accurate as the disassembly and diﬀerentiation of code
and data. Knowing that every function is correctly outlined is not exact, even for IDA Pro.
Therefore, this function diﬀerence method only serves as a guide for further investigation.
3.3

PLC and Firmware Selection
A PLC and its ﬁrmware must be selected, in order to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of the

technique. Below the criteria is discussed for selection. A PLC is selected ﬁrst, then the
ﬁrmware selection follows.
3.3.1

PLC Selection Criteria.

PLCs have a variable costs, but range in the thousands. The school provided several
PLC options at no cost to the student. The PLCs considered are Allen Bradley, Seimens,
and Omron. The Allen Bradley ControlLogix 1756-L61, B Series, Controller Module is
selected based on prior research conducted by Basnight [3].
3.3.2

Firmware Selection Criteria.

The L61 PLC has over a dozen ﬁrmware ﬁles to choose from the Allen Bradley
website [61]. The ﬁrmware update software is available with a simple user registration.
Each ﬁrmware update has a corresponding release notes which indicates when the ﬁrmware
update is released. Reviewing the update release notes revealed a disparity between
revisions and the dates released. Some ﬁrmware revision numbers (FRN), both major and
minor, are periodically updated and their original dates are then superseded with a current
release. For example, FRN 20.13 has a release date of October 2013 with a supersede date
of May 2012, while FRN 16.23 has a release date of October 2013 with a supersede date
of August 2013. By this comparison it seems as though FRN 16.23 is newer than FRN
20.13. Comparing the two ﬁrmware in terms of features revealed that FRN 20.13 is the
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latest ﬁrmware release. Therefore major and minor revision numbers are selection criteria,
and date release is not.
Three ﬁrmware versions were selected. FRN 20.13 is selected because it is the latest
ﬁrmware version for the L61. FRN 19.15 is selected due to a fellow graduate student
working on malware samples for the L61 ﬁrmware [63]. FRN 20.12 is selected as a minor
comparison to 20.13. The major ﬁrmware comparison is performed between 20.12 and
19.15, which completes the selection of ﬁrmware samples. To review, FRN 19.15 and
20.12 are a major revision apart, while 20.12 and 20.13 are a minor revision apart. Test
cases are discussed in the next chapter which will utilize these three ﬁrmware versions.
3.3.3

Firmware Extraction.

There are two methods for obtaining the L61 PLC ﬁrmware ﬁle. One method involves
downloading the ﬁrmware ﬁle from the manufacturer’s website, and the other method
involves extracting the ﬁle from the PLC using a hardware debugger. Both methods are
covered by Basnight [3] in greater detail. The method chosen for this experiment is the
website method since it is quicker. The process of extracting the ﬁrmware binary ﬁle is
discussed, then the process of verifying the ﬁle. The next chapter covers the test cases.
The ﬁrmware ﬁle for the L61 PLC is contained in an executable installer that is
downloaded from the manufacturer’s website. After the ﬁrmware package is downloaded
the executable must be installed to the local computer. Running ControlFlash.msi starts
the installation. Another software program called RSLogix is needed to upload the ﬁle to
the actual PLC. This process is skipped since uploading the ﬁrmware to the PLC is not
necessary for this experiment. Besides this, the installer still installs the ﬁrmware directly
to the local hard drive of the computer, regardless if RSLogix is installed or not. Once the
installer ﬁnishes it reports an error and closes. Searching through the ﬁle path after the
installer runs: C:\Program Files (x86)\ControlFLASH\0001\000E\0036\, yields the .bin
ﬁle which is the ﬁrmware ﬁle for the L61 PLC.
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To ensure that the baseline ﬁrmware ﬁle samples are unaltered from the website,
each ﬁrmware version is downloaded twice on separate dates. A week was chosen to be
suﬃcient time between downloads. Each ﬁrmware version was downloaded on diﬀerent
dates, and their second download was spaced one week apart for each version. Each version
is extracted to a separate folder and labeled. To test that each ﬁrmware version is unaltered
a hash test is performed on the same versions from diﬀerent download dates. Table 3.2
displays the veriﬁcation of the ﬁles with their corresponding download dates.
Table 3.2: Firmware Download Veriﬁcation and Dates
Firmware Version
19.15
20.12
20.13

3.4

Date 1
2013-10-05 16:23:03
2013-10-06 10:15:47
2013-10-07 21:26:05

Date 2
2013-10-12 09:14:52
2013-10-13 11:07:01
2013-10-14 14:50:16

Hash Diﬀerence
No
No
No

Summary
This chapter provides a methodology for ﬁrmware modiﬁcation analysis in PLCs.

There are ﬁve techniques used to determine modiﬁcations to include hashing, ﬁle
size comparison, opcode ﬁnger-printing (histogram) comparison, opcode diﬀerence
comparison, and function diﬀerence comparison.

These ﬁve techniques address the

goals of determining if ﬁrmware has been modiﬁed, and characterizes the nature of
the modiﬁcation. Details regarding the experiment set up, programming language used,
disassembler selection, code veriﬁcation, and scope are detailed. The next chapter covers
the ﬁve test cases and one control that will measure the eﬀectiveness of the tool. These
tests cases oﬀer a range of modiﬁcation conditions.
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IV.

Evaluation Test Cases

This chapter describes the test cases chosen to evaluate the software tool. There are
ﬁve test cases and one control case. Of the ﬁve cases one contains a single bit modiﬁcation,
two others are ﬁrmware attacks worked on by a fellow graduate student, and the other two
cases are unmodiﬁed legitimate ﬁrmware versions (major and minor apart). The details of
the test cases and the control case are discussed below.
4.1

Control Case
Similar to the ﬁrmware version validation test performed after the ﬁrmware package

is downloaded from the manufacturer’s website, the control test case baselines the FMAT
detection capabilities. Two copies of the FRN 20.013 ﬁle are tested. The FMAT should
detect that the ﬁrmware ﬁles are identical. The tool is designed to exit the tests if the
ﬁrmware hashes match during the ﬁrst test, however this functionality is suppressed to
allow the tool to further analyze the other comparison functions in the tool. The histograms
comparison should yield no diﬀerence in the characteristics chart and zeros across the delta
chart. The opcode diﬀerence comparison should yield identical disassembled code side-byside, and the function diﬀerence comparison should indicate that there are no modiﬁcations
to the functionality of the suspect.
4.2

Single Bit Change Case
There is one simple modiﬁcation test case to evaluate the FMAT. A single bit is

changed in ﬁrmware 20.013 to test the FMATs capabilities of detecting the smallest change
possible. Using HxD to make the modiﬁcation, an instruction is selected at address
0x24C244. This instruction is located in the function immediately called from the initial
entry point when the PLC is turned on. The opcode at the address, in little-endian format,
is 50 1E 81 E3, which is disassembled as ORR R1, R1, 0x500. One bit is changed to
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the opcode such that the ORR instruction become a BIC instruction. ORR as its name
suggests, performs a logical OR operation between register 1 (R1) and the value 500 (in
hexadecimal), and then stores the result back to R1. Changing a single bit in the tenth
binary position (Big-endian format) transforms this instruction into the BIC instruction.
BIC is also a logical instruction, but diﬀerent in purpose. BIC stands for Bit Clear, and
performs a logical AND between R1 and the inverted value of 500 which is 0xFFFFAFF
(32 bit ﬁxed-width value), and the result is then stored back to R1. If this modiﬁcation
were successfully uploaded to the PLC, introducing this single bit change will cause latent
instability in the entire program execution. Table 4.1 shows the changes made at the binary
level and the change represented in hexadecimal and at the instruction level. The change
made is emboldened in each view.
Table 4.1: Single Bit Change Views
Binary View*
Hex View*
Instruction View
11100011100000010001111001010000 E3 81 1E 50 ORR R1,R1, 0x500
11100011110000010001111001010000 E3 C1 1E 50 BIC R1,R1, 0x500
* Views shown in Big-endian format for easy left-to-right viewing

Note that this simple change results in the ﬁrmware being rejected by the PLC if it
were uploaded, since it calculates a cyclic redundancy check (CRC) and check-sum of
the ﬁrmware prior to accepting it. This test ignores this fact in order to test the FMAT’s
sensitivity. The tool should detect that the ﬁrmware ﬁles are not identical. The hash test
should indicate that a modiﬁcation has occured and two sets of diﬀerent hashes should be
displayed. The histograms comparison should yield a diﬀerence in the characteristics chart
based on the opcode being changed, and a one-for-one swap of opcodes for the delta chart.
The opcode diﬀerence comparison should yield a single diﬀerence for the disassembled
code side-by-side, and the function diﬀerence comparison should indicate that there is
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modiﬁcation made to the functionality of the suspect in terms of additions, subtractions,
or modiﬁcations.
4.3

Firmware Attack Cases
There are two cases that represent legitimate ﬁrmware attacks. Both were written by

a fellow graduate student. These modiﬁcations take the CRC and check-sum alteration
into account. Both malware sample are for FRN 19.15. The ﬁrst ﬁrmware attack sample
bypasses the PLC’s hardware diagnostic routine. No additions or deletions of code were
made to this ﬁrmware, only opcode alterations were made to the original ﬁrmware. These
alteration change the program ﬂow of the program (overstepping the diagnostics) and
zeroes the diagnostic routine.
A second malware sample represents an attack on the PLC’s logging and reporting
function. This change essentially reroutes the program to jump to another function, which
has been altered. The hardware diagnostic routine is also zeroed-out. The malware payload
attacks the mode switching caused by attempts to update the PLC. In order for this to
happen, a physical key at the front of the PLC must be switched from run to program
mode and vice-versa. The program mode routine checks for either a serial cable update, or
remote update and logs the event. Originally, a hardware interrupt would have moved to the
routine, however the suspect ﬁrmware modiﬁed the ﬂow of control to jump to the altered
hardware diagnostic section, which causes the program to go into an inﬁnite loop after
it recognizes that a switch has occurred multiple times. Once this threshold is reached,
the malware forces an inﬁnite loop which faults the PLC and shuts down. This attack
essentially causes a denial of service.
These test cases represent possible malware created by a single attacker with limited
resources, or who is part of an organization with limited resources.

This attacker

lacks access to the manufacturer’s proprietary speciﬁcations to the ﬁrmware binary ﬁle
organization, such as the ARM Binary Interface (ABI) for the L61. The tool should
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determine that both cases are not identical to their baseline ﬁrmware ﬁle. The hash test
should indicate that a modiﬁcation has occured and two sets of diﬀerent hashes should
be displayed. The histograms comparison should yield a diﬀerence in the characteristics
chart based on the opcode being changed, and the delta chart should display the diﬀerences
in opcode changes. The opcode diﬀerence comparison should yield diﬀerences for the
disassembled code side-by-side, and the function diﬀerence comparison should indicate
that there is modiﬁcation made to the functionality of the suspect in terms of additions,
subtractions, or modiﬁcations.
4.4

Function Diﬀerence Cases
These two test cases evaluate the speciﬁc function-diﬀerence-comparison aspect of

the FMAT. These two test cases take into consideration the fact that there is currently no
malware samples available for PLCs, and that the ﬁrmware attacks may not contain enough
modiﬁcations to test the function diﬀerence aspect of the tool. These test cases involve
legitimate FRN comparison between minor revisions (20.013 compared to 20.012), and
major revisions (19.015 compared to 20.012).
These test cases represent a comprehensive test of diﬀerences between ﬁrmware at all
the test levels. It is representative of a possible PLC ﬁrmware alteration made by a NationState with large resources and man-power. It is conceivable that this type of threat actor
would have access to knowledge of the ﬁrmware executable layouts, and tools available to
compile it like the manufacturer.
The hash test should indicate that a modiﬁcation has occurred and two sets of diﬀerent
hashes should be displayed. The size comparison may yield diﬀerent ﬁle sizes and will
be displayed. The histograms comparison should yield a diﬀerence in the characteristics
chart based on the opcode being changed, and the delta chart should display the diﬀerences
in opcode changes. The opcode diﬀerence comparison should yield diﬀerences for the
disassembled code side-by-side, and the function diﬀerence comparison should indicate
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that there is modiﬁcation made to the functionality of the suspect in terms of additions,
subtractions, or modiﬁcations.
4.5

Summary
This chapter covered test cases that evaluate the techniques eﬀectiveness. Five test

cases and one control case are discussed. Each test case is detailed, and focus on diﬀerent
aspects of the tool comparison functions. Next the results of the tests are discussed.
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V.

Firmware Modiﬁcation Analysis Results

In this chapter the results of the evaluation test cases are discussed. Each section
covers each test performed and the results for each test case are summarized. For example,
the hash comparison function is evaluated and the results for the ﬁve test cases and control
case are summarized under that section.
5.0.1

Hash Comparison.

Below is a summary of results for the hash comparison technique. Figure 5.1 displays
the hash test performed on the single bit change to illustrate what the tool displays. Table
5.1 summarizes the results of all ﬁve tests and the control test.

Figure 5.1: Hashes of Single Bit Modiﬁcation

Table 5.1: Summary of Single Bit Test Results
Base Version
19.15
19.15
19.15
20.12
20.13
20.13

Suspect
Hardware Diagnostic Attack
Logging Reporting Attack
20.12 (Major Version)
20.13 (Minor Version)
20.13 Control Case
Single Bit Change
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Hash Diﬀerence
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

Success
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

The hash comparison technique of the FMAT is successful in identifying modiﬁcations
made to all ﬁve test cases and the control case.
5.0.2

File Size Comparison.

Below is a summary of results for the ﬁle size comparison technique. Figure 5.2
displays the ﬁle size test performed on the control case to illustrate what the tool displays.
Table 5.2 summarizes the results of all ﬁve tests and the control test.

Figure 5.2: File Size Comparison of Control Case

Table 5.2: Summary of File Size Test Results
Base Version
19.15
19.15
19.15
20.12
20.13
20.13

Suspect
Diagnostic Attack
Logging Attack
20.12 (Major)
20.13 (Minor)
20.13 Control Case
Single Bit Change

Base Size
2,546,464 bytes
2,546,464 bytes
2,546,464 bytes
2,809,528 bytes
2,810,008 bytes
2,810,008 bytes

Suspect Size
2,546,464 bytes
2,546,464 bytes
2,809,528 bytes
2,810,008 bytes
2,810,008 bytes
2,810,008 bytes

Detect Size Diﬀ.
Equal
Equal
Suspect Larger
Suspect Larger
Equal
Equal

The ﬁle size comparison technique of the FMAT is successful in comparing ﬁle sizes
for all ﬁve test cases and the control case.
5.0.3

Opcode Histogram Comparison.

Below is a summary of results for the opcode histogram comparison technique. Figure
5.3 displays the histogram test performed on the major revision case, and histogram delta
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test performed on the minor revision case to illustrate what the tool displays. Table 5.2
summarizes the results of all ﬁve tests and the control test.

Figure 5.3: Histogram Comparisons of Firmware Major Revision

Figure 5.4: Histogram Comparisons of Firmware Minor Revision
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Table 5.3: Summary of Opcode Histogram Test Results
Base Firmware Version
19.15
19.15
19.15
20.12
20.13
20.13

Suspect
Diagnostic Attack
Logging Attack
20.12 (Major Version)
20.13 (Minor Version)
20.13 Control Case
Single Bit Change

Detect Opcode Char. Shift
Yes (Modiﬁcations only)
Yes (Modiﬁcations only)
Yes (Additions, Deletions)
Yes (Additions, Deletions)
No (Equal)
Yes (Modiﬁcations only)

The opcode histogram comparison technique of the FMAT is successful in identifying
opcode characteristic changes for all ﬁve test cases and the control case.

The two

ﬁrmware attacks and the single bit change case had the same ﬁle size, so the modiﬁcations
represented one-for-one opcode swaps. The control case did not detect a shift in opcodes
which is correct, and the major and minor cases had diﬀerent ﬁle size comparisons so they
represented a mixed combination of additions, deletions, and one-for-one code swaps.
5.0.4

Opcode Diﬀerence Comparison.

Below is a summary of results for the opcode diﬀerence comparison technique. Figure
5.4 displays the opcode diﬀerence test performed on the hardware diagnostic ﬁrmware
attack, including the diﬀerence bar chart to illustrate what the tool displays. Table 5.4
summarizes the results of all ﬁve tests and the control test.

Figure 5.5: Diﬀerence Bar Comparison of Hardware Diagnostic Modiﬁcation
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Figure 5.6: Side-by-side Opcode Comparison of Hardware Diagnostic Modiﬁcation

Table 5.4: Summary of Opcode Diﬀerence Test Results
Base Firmware Version
19.15
19.15
19.15
20.12
20.13
20.13

Suspect
Diagnostic Attack
Logging Attack
20.12 (Major Version)
20.13 (Minor Version)
20.13 Control Case
Single Bit Change

Detect Opcode Diﬀerences
Yes (3 areas)
Yes (4 areas)
Yes (Entire File)
Yes (Entire File)
No
Yes (1 area)

The opcode diﬀerence comparison technique of the FMAT is successful in identifying
opcode diﬀerences at each address for all ﬁve test cases and the control case. The two
ﬁrmware attacks and the single bit change case had opcode diﬀerences at a few locations,
whereas the major and minor cases had diﬀerences throughout the entire ﬁle. The control
case did not have any diﬀerences, and the tool was able to display no diﬀerence.
5.0.5

Opcode Functionality Comparison.

Below is a summary of results for the function diﬀerence technique. Figure 5.5
displays the opcode function test performed on the minor ﬁrmware revision, to including
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the modiﬁcations, additions and subtractions windows to illustrate what the tool displays.
Table 5.5 summarizes the results of all ﬁve tests and the control test.

Figure 5.7: Modiﬁcation Comparison of Firmware Minor Revision

Figure 5.8: Addition and Subtraction Comparison Views
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Table 5.5: Summary of Function Diﬀerence Test Results
Base Firmware Version
19.15
19.15
19.15
20.12
20.13
20.13

Suspect
Diagnostic Attack
Logging Attack
20.12 (Major Version)
20.13 (Minor Version)
20.13 Control Case
Single Bit Change

Detect Function Diﬀerences
No (Fail)
No (Fail)
Yes (1478)
Yes (1478)
No (Success)
Yes (1)

The function diﬀerence comparison technique of the FMAT is partially successful in
identifying function diﬀerences for four out of the ﬁve test cases, including the control
case. The two ﬁrmware attacks were not successfully detected. Clues were learned from
the graduate student about the nature of the failure. The modiﬁcations made to the attack
ﬁrmware are not accounted for in the call tree. This means that there are functions in
ﬁrmware that are not called by the main program. This highlights a limitation of the
function diﬀerence process using just the call tree analyzer. The L61 PLC instead utilizes
registers to jump from the main program to the hardware diagnostic attack and the logging
attack, which is the reason the FMAT did not detect the change.
5.1

Analysis
The FMAT performed as expected with the exception of missing function diﬀerences

in the ﬁrmware attack cases. Below is a table which compares metrics which summarizes
feature comparisons with the reverse engineering tools mentioned in chapter 2.
Table 5.6: FMAT vs. Standard Tool Comparison
Metric
Syntax Comparison
Semantic Comparison
Opcode Histogram

IDA Pro
None
None
None

VBinDiﬀ
Auto, Byte
None
None
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HxD
Manual, Byte
None
Byte-level

FMAT
Auto, Instruction
None
Instruction-level

As seen in the results, the FMAT uniﬁes views like the ones found in IDA Pro,
VBinDiﬀ and HxD into a single view and tool. Automating the task reduces the time
required to annotate all the ﬁrmware diﬀerences with a suspect binary ﬁle, and allows
analyst to shift their focus towards researching the semantic meaning of the diﬀerences.
Each analysis took the computer program under two minutes to complete the analysis, and
took the analyst about 20 minutes to run through all the changes and begin to understand
what the changes meant. The FMAT is not a stand alone tool, but is meant to be used in
conjunction with current tools to provide a complete summary of the diﬀerences between
two ﬁrmware ﬁles. As with all tools, the FMAT’s limitations stem from the uniqueness of
the code structure for PLCs and limits of static analysis.
5.2

Summary
In this chapter, the FMAT results are summarized to evaluate the FMAT detection

technique for ﬁve test cases and one control case. The tool shows that it can successful
identifying modiﬁcations made to ﬁrmware in every case and can characterize the nature of
the modiﬁcations for four of the six cases given (two failed to detect function diﬀerences).
Next the paper is concluded, and future work is discussed based on the set and discovered
limitations.
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VI.

6.1

Future Work and Conclusion

Conclusions
This research outlined a technique for automating modiﬁcation analysis for PLC

ﬁrmware.

It addresses PLC security concerns dealing with ﬁrmware modiﬁcation

detection. This technique provided a single tool which uniﬁes capabilities from multiple
tools currently provided, introduced new techniques for viewing and analyzing modiﬁed
code, and automated the syntax analysis process.

The tool focused on identifying

modiﬁcations made to ﬁrmware at an architecture level and did not determine if
modiﬁcations were malicious, instead an objective analysis of all diﬀerences made to the
assembly code is provided. The tool compares a known good baseline ﬁrmware ﬁle to a
suspected, compromised ﬁrmware ﬁle and conducts a static analysis of diﬀerence test. ﬁve
tests are conducted to detect and characterize the nature of the modiﬁcation. These tests
are the evaluated using ﬁve test cases and one control test. These ﬁve test cases and control
case validated the FMAT and uncovered unexpected limitations inherent to analyzing PLC
ﬁrmware. Although the function diﬀerences were not detected in the ﬁrmware attack cases
the other other tests performed before it detected the opcode diﬀerences.
6.2

Impact
Current security auditing tools focus on protection and recovery capabilities and focus

less on detection. This PLC security technique provides thorough detection capabilities
for static code analysis in PLC ﬁrmware and characterizes the nature of the modiﬁcation.
Being able to detect static code modiﬁcations sets the foundation for more precise analysis
techniques and thorough protection and recovery capabilities. Automating the analysis
process and providing a singular diﬀerence view reduces the skill set and tools needed
to perform syntax analysis, while reducing the errors made in the analysis process. The
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FMAT performs this code diﬀerence analysis in just a few minutes with a singular view.
Automating the analysis task shifts the focus to semantic code analysis, which may save a
forensic security teams time. Adding the unique opcode histogram view at the instruction
level-instead of the hex byte level-gives meaning to the opcode diﬀerences, and provides
another method of ﬁngerprinting malware.
This technique is applicable to industrial security as a whole, and has practical uses
in forensic analysis and future industrial security developments. It may also be used to
conduct future research in understanding ﬁrmware version changes. Private industry and
government agencies alike could beneﬁt from using this tool to respond to current threats
and is a foundation in developing dynamic analysis for ﬁrmware modiﬁcation. Having this
technique provides options for detecting ﬁrmware modiﬁcation, and narrowing the search
for other possible security breach vectors.
6.3

Future Work
The FMAT proved to conduct ﬁrmware modiﬁcation analysis eﬀectively. However,

the scope, limitations, and constraints addressed provides a wealth of future work for
improvement and the expanded research area of ﬁrmware modiﬁcation analysis.
6.3.1

Complete Firmware Inventory.

A limitation of the FMAT is the static analysis approach. The limits of static analysis
are reached and made apparent when conducting function diﬀerence analysis. The two
ﬁrmware attack cases performed on the L61 ﬁrmware revealed limited branch paths in the
entire ﬁrmware ﬁle. Clues in the tests revealed that many of these drivers had functions
that were not referenced from the main program and did not have return addresses to the
main program either. References to addresses outside the ﬁrmware address range were
also observed. Although the correct percentage of code and data for this speciﬁc PLC
ﬁrmware is not shared by the manufacturer, or readily known by conducting modiﬁcation
analysis, the low percentage of code reached through the call trees suggests that the ladder
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logic bridges the gap between the main program and its functions with the exception of
interrupts. Figure 5.1 illustrates this limitation.

Figure 6.1: Ladder Logic and PLC Firmware Roles

As seen in the attack ﬁrmware cases, the malware is able to run without ladder logic
because the attacks relied on hardware and software interrupts or register values, which
were not detected by the call tree analyzer. This limitation may be overcome with additional
methods that account for functions outside the call tree. Since a complete inventory of
opcodes is retained in the data structures of the FMAT, it takes less eﬀort to construct
other analyzer functions. The function inventory would be complete and the function
diﬀerence analysis detection would improve. Completing the function inventory improves
the accuracy of detecting function diﬀerences.
6.3.2

Additional Architecture Disassemblers.

This research technique utilized a single custom made disassembler (ARM7TDMI) to
evaluate ﬁrmware. Future research should include multiple ARM architecture versions and
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other architectures such as MIPS, PowerPC, Intel, and Motorola. Incorporating additional
disassemblers would require an architecture selection option, and a best guess algorithm
that selects a architecture type based on opcode heuristics. The second option would
prove useful in assisting the analyst if the architecture type is unknown. Sickendick [64]
proposed that Kolter and Maloofs boosted decision tree algorithm [33] is most eﬃcient at
determining architecture types and should be considered.
6.3.3

Classifying Code vs. Data.

Another area of consideration is the automation of classifying code from data. As
mentioned previously, the FMAT tool does not attempt to distinguish code from data, but
takes advantage of the ﬁxed four byte opcode/data alignment to decode the entire ﬁrmware
ﬁle as-is. An experienced analyst can decipher portions of code from data and use the
ASCII character window to aide in making decisions, but it is not error-proof. Code
classiﬁcation becomes crucial when attempting to correctly disassemble variable length
opcodes found in Complex Instruction Set Computing (CISC) architectures such as Intel,
since the reader will have to step through variable lengths of opcodes. Wartell et al.
[69] proposed a method for this type of classiﬁcations for Intel, and may prove useful in
incorporating this technique along with adding multiple disassemblers. It should be noted
that embedded devices use RISC architectures almost exclusively, so adding the CISC
architecture would broaden the tools search beyond PLC ﬁrmware to general computer
architecture platforms, or future PLC platforms that would include CISC architectures.
6.3.4

Incorporating Thumb Instruction Analysis.

The FMAT limited its instruction analysis and disassembly to regular ﬁxed-length
(32 bit) ARM instructions and did not analyze or disassemble 16 bit ﬁxed-length Thumb
instructions. This process requires a separate pass through the ﬁle to analyze potential
Thumb instructions. This step is necessary for completing the static analysis capability of
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the FMAT and the ARM disassembler, and provides the needed foundation for dynamic
analysis.
6.3.5

Dynamic Firmware Modiﬁcation Analysis.

The static diﬀerences in code were made readily apparent, but analysis of the semantic
diﬀerences is left to the analyst to evaluate. Dynamic analysis is needed to understand
the semantics of ﬁrmware modiﬁcation. A scenario is proposed to build a test case
for determining behavioral diﬀerences between a suspect and base ﬁrmware. First a
speciﬁc ICS system must be selected and engineered to speciﬁcation, unless it is able
to be simulated through software means. A working PLC base ﬁrmware and ladder
logic program is chosen based on the scenario and data is then collected which captures
the time and states of the PLC and the devices attached to it. The system under test
would be the dynamic ﬁrmware modiﬁcation analyzer which records a baseline pattern
of static and dynamic data. Later an attack ﬁrmware and identical ladder logic program
is recorded and then analyzed by the dynamic ﬁrmware modiﬁcation analyzer to detect
the dynamic changes made to the ﬁrmware. The dynamic ﬁrmware modiﬁcation analyzer
coupled with the static ﬁrmware analyzer create a picture which is compared for syntax and
semantic diﬀerences. This would address the shortfalls of the static analysis and provide
an automated approach for understanding semantic behavior diﬀerences.

Additional

information regarding semantic and dynamic analysis is discussed in Christodorescu et
al. papers [13, 24, 57].
6.4

Concluding Remarks
Detecting security threats is the cornerstone of information assurance. This research

demonstrates a technique that aides analysts in ﬁnding diﬀerences between altered ﬁrmware
and a known good ﬁrmware baseline quickly and eﬃciently. Automation of complex tasks,
while keeping the analysis simple and straightforward, ensures that a variety of experiencelevel analysts can use this technique eﬀectively. More critical is the presentation of the
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ﬁrmware modiﬁcation analysis technique as a foundation for further detailed and complex
analysis techniques that focus on semantics rather than syntax.
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